Abstract
Introduction
The relationship between economic conditions and fertility is a classic research question in demography. The literature often mentions that fertility follows the cycles of the economy, while in times of economic downturn and uncertainty in the labor market, people are led to postpone childbearing, to adjust their family planning. (Goldstein, et al. , 2013; Adserà, 2004; Sobotka, Skirbekk &Philipov, 2011; Hofmann & Hohmeyer, 2012; Schmitt 2008 and .
From a theoretical point of view, the issue that fertility 'react' positively in times of economic growth and "negative" in economic recessions has been discussed for over two centuries. Originally, Adam Smith in his work the "Wealth of Nations" in 1776, links the economic growth with the population growth. Becker (1960) , studies the relation between fertility and income level. Easterlin (1973 Easterlin ( , 1976 considers fertility as a function of the economic environment of the younger generations, based on the experience they had during childhood years, living in the parental household.
In contrast of the above theories Ward (1979a, 1979b) analyzing data for the US fertility of the first half of the decade of 70s, introduces the theory that fertility follows the opposite trend compared to the cycles of the economy. Considering the increasing participation of women in the labor market, he claims that the acquisition of a child in economic good times increases the "opportunity cost" for a woman. However, Macunovich (1996) argues that fertility remains linked to the cycles of the economy, while the negative effects of high unemployment during economic downturns are greater than any benefits of the reduction of '' value '' of women's work.
Nowadays, with the onset of the economic crisis in [2007] [2008] in the US and the subsequent dissemination of European countries, the interest for exploring the relationship between economic crises and fertility is revived.
The investigation of the potential impacts of the current economic crisis on the fertility levels of the population in Greece is based on analysis of the empirical data, provided by the Hellenic Statistical Authority (ELSTAT). These are,
• Number of births by five-year age group of mother,
• Number of births by five-year age group of mother and order of birth,
• Mean population sizes of women in reproductive ages by five-year age groups.
Although we have long time series for our analysis, we should note that the period from the onset of the crisis and beyond is relatively short (five years only, 2010-2014), while not yet available by ELSTAT data on births of 2014. This does not facilitate the investigation of potential impacts of the crisis on fertility.
From the end of the civil war (1949) until 1967, the number of births (Chart 1, 
Total Fertility Rate
The Total Fertility Rate (TFR) indicating the average number of children per woman, (Figure 2, and Table 2 , in Appendix), the first 30 years, until the early 1980s, recorded relatively high values (among the highest in European countries, namely 2. 2-2. 4 children per woman). In particular, at the beginning of the examined period TFR equals 2. 31 children / woman and remains stable for a decade at levels higher the reproduction limit although with slight fluctuations since in 1967, when it reaches its highest value (2. 45). Then, after 1980, in a first period, TFR will record a rapid decline (at 1989 equals 1. 40 children / woman), resulting in the inclusion of Greece in the group of low fertility countries. The downward trend will continue clearly and slowly during the following decade, so in 1999 TFR takes its lowest value (1. 24 children / woman), leading to the accession of Greece, in accordance with the international bibliography, in countries with very low fertility (Lowest-Low Fertility) . From the early years of 21th century TFR begins to recover (in 2005 will exceed 1. 3 children / woman and 2008-2010 will roughly exceed 1. 5 children/woman). However the increase of TFR will not further continue, while in 2013 its value will be significantly lower (1. 3 children / woman).
Mean age of childbearing
The mean age of childbearing in both all births as well as for first births, is characterized by considerable fluctuations (Table  2 in Appendix). The mean age for all births is high and relatively stable during the first postwar years while it declines from the early 1960s (decrease by 2. 6 years between 1960 and 1981). This drop is obviously a result of continuous increasing 1951 1953 1955 1957 1959 1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 CFR (00/0) BIIRTHS
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of the age-specific fertility rates for younger reproductive ages (<25 years) and the simultaneous decline of the corresponding rates in mature reproductive ages. But after a short time (until 1985) of relative stability the mean age will start to slowly increase at the beginning, but faster in following years, resulting togrow by about 5 years between 1985 and 2013 (26in 1985 to 30. 9 in 2013) . This increase is mainly due (up to the mid-1990s) to reduce of the age-specific fertility rates at younger ages, and from the late 1990s onwards, the increase of mean age at childbearing can be contributed to the increase of the age-specific fertility rates in mature reproductive ages. Figure 3 illustrates the progress of the age-specific fertility rates. A first view of the figure shows that the rates in the younger reproductive ages (years 15-24) exhibit an upward trend until the beginning of the 1980s, a trend that will be reversed in the next twenty years, leading them to collapse. The decline will halt temporarily for a short period (the 2000s) and will start again after 2010. Unlike the development of the age-specific rates of younger reproductive ages, the corresponding one for the later reproductive ages (> 30 years) will move initially downward, at the beginning of first decade of 21th century and then upward. In recent years, however, coinciding with the onset of the economic crisis in Greece, it is becoming a common trend: the rates in almost all ages significantly decline. A special behavior and diversified development follow the rates at ages 26-29. These rates follow an upward trend (as those of ages below 25 years) but they strongly fail during the decade of 80s, while they exhibit some temporary signs of recovery in later years. Figure 4 , which illustrate the completed fertility in successive ages, show that the completed fertility in the age 25 until the late 70s is increasing. Thereafter it is decreasing in all age groups. Figure 5 also confirms our previous conclusions, namely that the rise of TFR since 2000 -and in particular the differentiation in 2009 compared with 1999 is solely due to the increase of fertility levels of ages greater than 30. The figure also clearly reflects all changes of fertility levels throughout the period considered, especially those of the last fifteen years, and also confirm that the increase of TFR since 2000 is solely due to declining fertility of younger ages and thatthe fall of TFRthereafteris due to declining fertility of all ages. Moreover it becomes obvious that though the high values of TFR until 1980 is due to young ages, their subsequent reduction is almost entirely due to the same ages, while this reduction does not offset until the late '90s by increasing fertility of ages greater than 30. 1960 1964 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 1960 1964 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 (. Figure4: Greece, completed fertility in successive ages for chosen years.
2. 5. Fertility by birth order
Analysis of fertility by birth order allows to consider a) whether -and to what extent, the reduction in cross-sectional fertility after 1980 resulted from the reduce of total births and whetherthere are signs of changing family patterns , particularly regarding childlessness and b) to formulate some hypotheses for the most recent periodafter 2009 (years of crisis).
Examining the evolution of births in the postwar period ( Figure 5 and Table 3 in Appendix) we first find that the first order births steadily increase. In particular, the first births being 40% of total births in the 50s, now (in 2013) represent 51% of the total, while the latter have risen slightly by the end of the 70s (from 32-33% to 38%) to then they stabilize. The steadily increasing participation of births of 1st and 2nd order clearly reflected in the figure, while in 1960 they are 73% of the total, from the mid-1970s they are 80% of total births, while inthe late 90s they exceed 85% (89% in 2013) of total births.
Births of 3 rd , 4 th or higher orders exhibit a relatively smooth progression and fewer fluctuations in relation to the first two classes by following, though with differentiated rates, a rough downtrend (faster decline of births of 4 th or higherorders in relation to those of 3 rd order). Specifically, unlike the first two births orders, 3 rd order births reduce slowly (from 15% in the 50 to 9% recently), and those of 4 th or higher orders are collapsing (from 13% to 3%). It is worth noticed that in the 50s births or 4 th or higher orders was around 20, 000, whereas those of 2013 just exceeded 3, 000. These trends are consistent with the apparently shrinking and gradual disappearance of large families. In the next period (1964 -1980) it will stabilize more or less around the unit, while during '80s it will significantly diminished by 40%, (0, 98 in1980 and 0, 62 at 1989). During the 90s it will stabilize around 0. 6 children/woman, followed by the mid2000s rise (2010 = 0. 75 children/woman) while it will exhibit a small decline in the first years of the crisis (2011-2013).
Close if not identical progression-will follow TFR of 2 nd order. This indicator after a rising period (0. 69 children / woman in 1960, 0. 92 in 1970), it will stabilize in 1970 to collapse then during the 1980s (0. 55 children/woman in 1989). The fall will continue at a milder pace than during the 90s (0. 47 children / woman in 1999) will be stopped thereafter while it will begin an upward trend after 2010. 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 UnlikeTFR of 1 st and 2 nd order of births, that of 3 rd order will remain constant for about twenty years (around 0. 3 children), thereafter it will be 50% lower between 1980 and 1989 (0. 16 children), while it will stabilize thereafter around the value of 0. 14 and it will slightly raise after 2005 (0. 17 in 2010). Finally as regards TFR of 4 th class and above these will follow an uninterrupted downward trend throughout the period considered (0. 32 in 1960 and 0. 04 in 2013).
Our analysis shows that while the collapse of the total TFR during the 1980s is due to all orders of birth, the most significant "responsibility" have the indicators of 1 st and 2 nd orders. In particular, the reduction of TFR between 1980 and 1989 is due almost half (45%) to the collapse of 1 st order TFR and secondarily the diminishing of 2 nd order TFR (participation 35%). By extension, the declining values of indicators of 1 st and 2 nd order can be attributed almost by 80% to the reduction of the total cross-sectional fertility during the first period of its rapid collapse. Similarly, the increase in total TFR between 1999 and 2009 is by 52% due to the increase in 1 st order TFR, 34% to the increase 2 nd order TFR and only 14% to the increase of the 3 rd order TFR. Finally, the reduction of the total TFR between the years of crisis (from 2010 and 2013) is solely due to the reduction of the corresponding TFRs of the first two orders.
Changes to mean age at birth by birth order are depicted in Figure 7 and Table 4 in Appendix. The average age drops to all orders of birth until the early-mid 1980s to reverse then for the births of 1 st , 2 nd and 3 rd order. Thus, the average age at 1 st order birth increases by 5. 7 years between 1983 and 2013, while the average age of 2 nd birth increases by 5. 3 years 10 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 
The impact of economic crisis to fertility, first conclusions
Our analysis shows that the collapse of the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) in Greece during the 80s was mainly due to the change of the women's fertility calendar as all generation until 1975 will record a TFR > 1. 7 children / woman (at least 4 decimal points higher than the lowest value of TFR noted in 1999). The growth of this indicator in the 2000s is solely due to a compensation of the postponement of births in the previous two decades and absolutely not to an increase of the average number of children in the younger generations. The recent reversal of the upward trend of TFR coincides indeed with the emergence of the financial crisis, however it cannot be attributed solely to it.
At the same time, in Greece, the available data indicate that the recent economic crisis is affecting in priority women under 30 years old (extreme high unemployment). However, this crisis coincided with a previous trend of increasing the mean age at the childbearing, started in the mid '80s). This trend has resulted at 2013 to an extremely high average age at childbearing (30 years for the first child). Therefore, any continued postponement of childbearing to higher ages during the years of crisis (probable on the basis of international experience) will possibly lead to unavoidable fall of fertility of younger generations (i. e. those who were born after 1985) as, even if women of those generations aim to acquire one, two, three or more children, a part of them will not succeed it (any replacement is problematic as child conception is a function of age and decrease rapidly after 30 years old).
It should also be pointed out that childbearing occurs in Greece within marriage (the percentage of non-marital births is the lowest in Europe). Simultaneously, the mean age at first marriage follows the last thirty years an ascending course (from 23. 2 years in the mid-1980s to 29. 2 years in 2013). Based on the above, the mean age at first marriage and the mean age at first child birth are, directly correlated. Therefore, in a country like Greece, where childbearing occurs almost entirely within marriage with both partners employed, it was important for most women of these generations to have a relatively stable work before their first marriage and their first child acquisition. Given the extreme high unemployment rate in the age groups 20-35, this fact is not valid for a part of this population group, resulting to the collapse of the first marriage rates in recent years. As a direct result, we observe a further increase both of the percentage of unmarried women in younger generations and also of the average age at the first marriage. Both of them (the second in combination with the postponement of marital births) will inevitably lead to a further decline of the total fertility rate of younger generations of women (those born after 1985).
In conclusion, according to the international bibliography, in countries with strong social policies and especially policies supporting family and childbearing the negative effects of the crisis are diminished. In Greece, at the beginning of the crisis, the welfare state was not particularly developed and, at the same time, it was extremely inefficient. In this context, family and childbearing aid measures were very limited, focused almost exclusively on the large families (>3 children) and in some cases these measures were inefficient (see for example retirement criteria for mothers with a minor child). The recent measures (those adapted in the first half of the current decade) were usually horizontal, while available policies resources shrank significantly while their rehabilitation is not expected in the near future. All these facts does not allow some optimism concerning the reversal of fertility decline of younger generations which, as expected, that they are going to spend a significant part of their reproductive life in crisis conditions. 
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